SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-SIXTH

AMENDMENT-OFFENDERS

CONVICTED OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED ARE NOT ENTI-

TLED TO AJURY TRIAL-State

v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109, 577 A.2d

1259 (1990).
The defendant, Donald Hamm, had been convicted of driving while intoxicated ("DWI") on two separate occasions in violation of NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a) (West 1988). 121 NJ. at 111,
579 A.2d at 1260. On August 10, 1976, the defendant was arrested for his third DWI offense.
Prior to trial, the municipal court judge denied Hamm's motion for a jury trial. Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to twenty-eight days in an inpatient
program, sixty days in an outpatient program and ninety days of
community service. Id. In addition, the court fined Hamm
$1,000, imposed a $100 surcharge, assessed $15 in court costs,
and suspended his driver's license for ten years. On appeal, the
New Jersey Superior Court Law Division upheld the trial court's
denial of a jury trial and the appellate division subsequently affirmed. Id. Thereafter, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted
the defendant's petition for certification and held that DWI offenders are not entitled to a jury trial because the penalties imposed are not considered to be constitutionally "serious" so as to
warrant a trial by jury. Id.
The court began its analysis by noting that the issue in question concerns a federal Constitutional right. Id. at 112, 577 A.2d
at 1261. Justice O'Hern, writing for a unanimous court in which
Justice Clifford did not participate, articulated that the federal
analysis will focus on a recently decided United States Supreme
Court decision. Id. (citing Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489
U.S. 538 (1989)).
In Blanton, the Court determined that in Nevada, a first time
DWI offender is not entitled to a jury trial. Id. (citation omitted).
The Nevaida statute, the Court explained, provides that first time
DWI offenders face a minimum penalty of between two days and
six months of incarceration or forty-eight hours of community
work. Id. Additionally, the defendant must pay a fine ranging
from $200 to $1,000, enter an alcohol abuse education program
at his own expense, and forfeit his driver's license for ninety
days. Id. (citation omitted). The majority in Blanton emphasized
that the minimum sentence of incarceration must be more than
six months in order to grant the defendant a right to a jury trial;
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anything less than six months is viewed as a "petty" offense. Id.
at 112-13, 577 A.2d at 1261 (citation omitted). In addition to
the incarceration period, the Blanton Court considered additional
penalties imposed under the Nevada DWI laws. Id. at 113, 577
A.2d at 1261-62 (citation omitted). Based on its review of the
aggregate fines and penalties, the Court held that a first time
DWI conviction was not a "serious" offense and thus, a defendant is not entitled to a sixth amendment jury trial. Id. at 113-14,
577 A.2d 1261-62 (citation omitted). Justice Marshall further
recognized that the $1,000 maximum penalty imposed on a first
time offender fails to satisfy the Congressional requirement that
a "petty" offense impose a fine of at least $5,000. Id. at 114, 577
A.2d 1262 (citation omitted).
The Blanton Court, however, acknowledged that a state's legislature may impose such onerous fines and penalties that a jury
trial may be warranted. Id. (citation omitted). The Court reasoned that although the maximum period of incarceration is less
than six months, a jury trial may be necessary if a "legislature
packs an offense" with penalties which are considered "serious."
Id. (citation omitted). The Hamm Court, however, argued that
the majority in Blanton neglected to communicate the requisite
criteria for a penalty to be deemed "serious." Id.
Applying the reasoning used in Blanton, the Court, in Hamm,
considered whether the DWI conviction as "packed" by the New
Jersey Legislature should be "serious" for sixth amendment purposes. Id. at 115, 577 A.2d at 1262. While the court recognized
that Governor Kean described New Jersey's DWI laws as the
"toughest in the nation," the court contended that the Governor
was not referring to the criminal punishment, but rather to the
regulations accompanying safety requirements, as well as to the
public's heightened awareness of drunk driving. Id. Justice
O'Hern posited that although the legislature views driving while
intoxicated as a grave social problem, it has yet to impose penalties which would mandate that a DWI conviction be considered
criminal. Id. at 116, 577 A.2d at 1263. Accordingly, the court
held that DWI is not an offense that necessitates a jury trial. Id.
The unanimous court advocated that the DWI dilemma is best
tempered by rehabilitation and reparation. Id.
The court stated that, aside from the $1,000 fine and 180
day incarceration period, penalties for third time DWI offenders
are civil in nature. Id. at 117, 577 A.2d at 1263. The court
stressed that violations of the Motor Vehicle Act are simply not
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crimes. Id. at 118, 577 A.2d at 1264 (citation omitted). In concluding this segment of its analysis, the court recognized that
even though a third DWI offense cannot be equated with a crime
in regard to the punishment, its "seriousness" must be addressed
in light of the Blanton decision. Id. at 122, 577 A.2d at 1266. The
court then directed its attention to penalties other than imprisonment and fines in order to ascertain whether the offense was "serious." Id. at 123, 577 A.2d at 1266.
Justice O'Hern acknowledged that the most glaring difference between New Jersey's drunk driving laws and the statute at
issue in Blanton is the ten year license suspension for a third time
offender. Id. The Hamm Court opined that the opportunity to
drive a car in New Jersey is not merely a privilege but rather, an
almost necessary right. Id. at 124, 577 A.2d at 1266. The court
maintained, however, that license suspension is not to be considered a "serious" enough penalty to trigger ajury trial. Id. Justice
O'Hern rationalized that other valued licenses can be revoked
without a jury trial. Id. The Justice posited that a tavern owner
can lose his liquor license at an administrative hearing and a doctor, lawyer or broker can lose his license without a jury trial. Id.
Thus, the Court reasoned that because other valued licenses can
be stripped without a jury trial, the suspension of a driver's license likewise does not necessitate a trial by jury. Id. at 119-20,
577 A.2d at 1266-67.
The unanimous court noted that the ten year license suspension does not reflect an increase in the seriousness of the offense.
Id., 577 A.2d at 1267. Rather, the court asserted that it connotes
a social determination as to what works best with DWI offenders.
The court reasoned that although a ten year driver's license suspension is a tremendous burden on the offender, it is far outweighed by the increase in public safety. Id. at 124-25, 577 A.2d
at 1267.
Justice O'Hern next addressed the remaining penalties and
concluded that the rehabilitative procedures and enforcement
surcharges were reasonable. Id. at 125, 577 A.2d at 1267. The
court explained that increased insurance premiums could have
just as easily resulted from an accumulation of a few speeding
tickets or a minor accident. Id. The DWI surcharge, the court
noted, flowed from the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1982 and was not part of the legislature's intent to
"pack" the offense. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that
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the "petty offense" of DWI is not a "serious" penalty and hence
does not warrant a jury trial. Id.
There is no.doubt that drunk driving is an extremely dangerous and prevalent problem in today's society. While the court
cited sound reasons for rejecting a jury trial for DWI offenders,
due to the harsh penalty engendered from a conviction, one can
easily view such an offense as "serious." The defendant's loss of
license is a penalty that implicitly discriminates against those individuals who derive their livelihood from driving. Such individuals may endure greater punishment by being precluded from
driving for a whole decade than by spending six months in jail.
Additionally, a patent contradiction arises out of labeling a ten
year suspension a "petty" offense. While the legislature acknowledges the need for a car in today's society, it frowns upon those
who not once, but twice, refuse to appreciate the necessity of an
automobile. The legislature should be applauded for revoking
such persons' licenses for ten years. However, because of the
length of time without this "almost necessity," the right should
not be taken away without a trial by a jury.
George Koroghlian

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-PREEMPTION

AND

RETROACTIVITY-

FAILURE TO WARN AND MISREPRESENTATION IN ADVERTISING

ACTIONS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT AND NEW JERSEY PRODUCTS LIABIL-

iTY ACT NOT APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO ELIMINATE DESIGNDEFECT CAUSE OF ACTION-Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds, 121 N.J.

69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
Wilfred E. Dewey smoked cigarettes from 1942 until eight
months prior to his death from lung cancer in 1980. 121 N.J. at
73, 577 A.2d at 1241. Specifically, Dewey began smoking Viceroy brand cigarettes in 1977, eleven years after the enactment of
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (Cigarette
Act). The Cigarette Act requires that each package of cigarettes
display a warning of the health hazards related to smoking. Consequently, the decedent's wife brought suit against Brown and
Williamson Tobacco Co., the manufacturers of Viceroy cigarettes
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alleging that Viceroys were defectively designed by not being
reasonably safe, suitable, and fit for human use when placed into
the stream of commerce, and also asserting that Viceroys contained an inadequate warning. Mrs. Dewey additionally made a
claim for misrepresentation and fraud in advertising.
Upon discovering that the decedent did not begin smoking
Viceroy cigarettes until just three years prior to his death, Brown
and Williamson moved for summary judgment. Brown and Williamson's motion was based on the assertion that: 1) the Cigarette Act preempted Mrs. Dewey's claims of inadequate warning
and misrepresentation in advertising, and 2) the New Jersey
Products Liability Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2)(West
1987), which provides a defense to sellers and manufacturers for
the harmful effects of products whose hazards are known to the
ordinary user, applied retroactively to invalidate Mrs. Dewey's
design-defect claims. The trial court dismissed Mrs. Dewey's failure to warn, misrepresentation, and fraud in advertising claims
on the basis that such claims were preempted by the Cigarette
Act. 121 N.J. at 73, 577 A.2d 1241. The court, however, permitted Mrs. Dewey's design-defect claim stating that she could pursue this claim by demonstrating, under the "risk-utility" test for
design-defects, that "the risks [from] cigarettes outweighed their
utility." Id. at 74, 577 A.2d at 1241.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed
the lower court's decision with certain modifications. Id. Specifically, the appellate division added that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 402 A comment i, was applicable to Mrs.
Dewey's claims. Id. Section 402A precludes the application of
strict liability in situations where an. ordinary consumer
purchases a product with the knowledge that the product possesses dangerous propensities. 121 N.J. at 73, 577 A.2d at 1241.
Thus, a determination that the decedent's death was caused by
the known danger in smoking cigarettes would necessarily prevent recovery by Mrs. Dewey. Id. at 74-75, 577 A.2d at 1241.
The court noted, however, that material issues of fact existed as
to Brown and Williamson's ability to minimize, through design,
the inherent dangers associated with cigarette smoking. Id. at 75,
577 A.2d at 1241. The appellate division, therefore, upheld the
design-defect cause of action. Id., 577 A.2d at 1242. On appeal,
the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate division upholding Mrs. Dewey's action for design-defect.
Id. at 76-77, 577 A.2d at 1242. The court, however, reversed the
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lower court's rulings with regard to both the inadequate warning
and fraud and misrepresentation in advertising claims. Id. at 100,
577 A.2d at 1255.
Justice Clifford, writing for the majority, declared that Congress did not intend the Cigarette Act to preempt the state common-law remedies for inadequate warnings and -fraudulent
advertising of products. Id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251. Successful
claims for inadequate warnings at the state level, the justice asserted, would enhance the purposes of the Cigarette Act, as well
as support the public policy in favor of compensating those who
are injured by harmful products. Id. at 90-91, 577 A.2d at 1249.
Consequently, the court upheld Mrs. Dewey's claims against
Brown and Williamson for the inadequate warning and fraud and
misrepresentation in advertising. Id. at 100, 577 A.2d at 1255.
In addition, the court ruled that the NewJersey Products Liability
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987) would not apply
retroactively to extinguish Mrs. Dewey's design-defect claim because the law represents a new principle in products liability
which precludes retroactive application. 121 NJ. at 95, 577 A.2d
at 1252. In so doing, the court rejected the argument that Section 3a(2) was merely a codification of existing New Jersey common law rules of products liability. Id. at 99, 577 A.2d at 1254.
The court conducted an analysis of preemption and its effects on state law, noting that "Congress may preempt state common law as well as state statutory law through federal
legislation." Id. at 77, 577 A.2d at 1243 (quoting Chicago N. W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1981)).
The court emphasized that the pivotal question concerning preemption is whether Congress intended the federal legislation to
supersede the state law. Id. The court recognized that the intent
to preempt may be expressly defined or arise by implication in
situations where the purpose of the federal law is so pervasive or
conflicts with state law such that it is not possible for the state law
to survive. Id. Furthermore, Justice Clifford acknowledged that
preemption turns on statutory interpretation and construction
and that "[t]he Third Circuit has already determined that the
Cigarette Act preempts failure to warn claims as well as claims
challenging the content of cigarette advertising." Id. at 78, 577
A.2d at 1243 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 789 F.2d 181, 187
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987)). The court,
however, found that the Cigarette Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempts existing common law tort remedies for made-
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quate warnings and fraud in advertising. Id. at 86, 577 A.2d at
1247.
The court observed that the Cigarette Act has two purposes:
1) to inform the public through use of a warning label that cigarette smoking is dangerous, and 2) to promote uniformity in
cigarette labeling. Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248. The court questioned whether the choice of state common law remedies would
impede the objectives of the Cigarette Act. Id. The court, answering in the negative, determined that this option would further, rather than impair the goals of the Cigarette Act. Id. at 8788, 577 A.2d at 1248.
Justice Clifford rejected the idea that an award at the state
level for an inadequate warning would create the need for additional regulations by the manufacturer which would conflict with
the Cigarette Act's objective of maintaining uniform regulations
for all cigarette packages. Id. at 88, 577 A.2d at 1248. Instead,
the court reasoned that as long as the requirements of the Cigarette Act are met, the manufacturer has the option to add or refrain from including additional health warnings. Id. at 90, 577
A.2d at 1249. In short, Justice Clifford determined that the effect
of successful state level claims for inadequate warnings would be
merely an incentive to manufacturers to provide additional warnings, and not a violation of the purpose of the Cigarette Act. Id.
Finally, the court noted that the state tort claims provide compensation to people injured by harmful products. Id. at 90-91,
577 A.2d at 1249. Such a result, Justice Clifford argued, is consistent with the public policy in favor of compensating those injured by defective products and allocating the risk of loss to
manufacturers who place those products in the stream of commerce. Id. Consequently, the court contended that Congress did
not intend to shield cigarette manufacturers from warning, labeling, and misrepresentation claims through preemption of state
common law remedies. Id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251.
The court devoted the latter part of its analysis to the issue
of whether the New Jersey Products Liability Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:58C-3a(2) (West 1987), applied retroactively to eliminate
claims for design defects present in cigarettes. Id. The court
agreed that the law provides a defense to sellers and manufacturers for harm resulting from products whose dangerous effects are
known to the ordinary user. Id. Justice Clifford stressed, however, that this provision does not affect the three traditional theories under which a seller or manufacturer can be held liable for
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damage from a product: defects in manufacture, design, and
warning. Id. at 94-95, 577 A.2d at 1252. Rather, the court stipulated that New Jersey's Products Liability Act represents a "new
rule" of strict liability for defective products and not a codification of the existing common law. Id. at 95, 577 A.2d at 1252.
This rule, the court reasoned, created new guidelines concerning
the imposition of liability and the burden of proof in products
liability actions. Id. at 96, 577 A.2d at 1252-53. Thus, the court
maintained that Section 3a(2) of the Products Liability Act would
not be applied retroactively, pursuant to the belief that a statute
that concerns substantive rights and alters settled law is prospective only, unless an expressed legislative intent states otherwise.
Id. at 95, 577 A.2d at 1252.
The court acknowledged that any reliance on comment i of
the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

Section 402A, as a codifica-

tion of the common law of New Jersey and subject to retroactivity, must fail. Id. at 97, 577 A.2d at 1253. Justice Clifford noted
that the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" products as set
forth in comment i of the RESTATEMENT excluded tobacco products whose use resulted in harmful effects. Id. The justice explained that the court has never embraced the classification of
products referred to in comment i of the RESTATEMENT. Id.
Thus, the court observed that while some provisions of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

have been adopted by the New

Jersey courts and are codified in the Products Liability Act, no
such codification occurred so as to allow any retroactivity void
design-defect claims. Id. at 98, 577 A.2d at 1254.
Judge Antell, temporarily assigned, concurred in the majority's assertion that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58-3a(2) (West 1987)
does not apply retroactively to Mrs. Dewey's design-defect claim.
121 N.J. at 100-101, 577 A.2d at 1255 (Antell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Judge Antell, however, disagreed
with the majority's decision regarding the preemption issue. Id.
The judge asserted that the labeling requirement of the Cigarette
Act preempts state level product liability claims that challenge
the sufficiency of a manufacturer's warning. Id. The dissent
stated that in its analysis of the preemption issue, the court
should not have departed from the conclusions of several United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which endorsed Congressional preemption of state court
claims of inadequate warnings with relation to relating to cigarettes. Id. at 101, 577 A.2d at 1255 (Antell, J., concurring in part
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and dissenting in part). Judge Antell opined that the majority's
decision to allow claims testing the adequacy of warnings at the
state level, compromise the federal objective of protecting the
national economy and commerce. Id. at 102, 577 A.2d at 1256
(Antell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent asserted that the majority focused on the goal of informing
the public of the hazards of smoking, yet overlooked the general
scheme and purpose of the Cigarette Act. Id. at 103, 577 A.2d at
1256 (Antell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
short, Judge Antell maintained that the language of the Cigarette
Act left no doubt as to the adequacy of warnings on cigarette
packages and therefore warranted preemption of state court
claims regarding such warnings. Id.
Holding manufacturers liable for the inadequate warnings
and dangerous design-defects associated with cigarettes subjects
tobacco manufacturers to the same liability that manufacturers of
most other products must bear. Given the addictive quality of
cigarettes and the frequency with which consumers purchase this
product, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision favoring the
consumer's right to sue for inadequate warnings and design-defects seems justified. In addition, manufacturers of tobacco
products enjoy substantial profits. The court's decision creates
room for successful state claims against manufacturers that will
severely affect manufacturers by depleting their profits. While
the dissent broadly criticizes the majority for allegedly failing to
focus on the overall scheme and purpose of federal legislation,
the majority should be applauded for thoroughly analyzing difficult issues and making an equitable decision.
Susan Milone Iovine

CRIMINAL

LAW-CAPITAL SENTENCING-STRICKLAND TEST

PLIED TO DETERMINE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

AP-

OF COUNSEL

CLAIMS IN CAPITAL DEFENSE CASES-State v. Savage,

120 N.J.

594, 577 A.2d 455 (1990).
In a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted Roy Savage of capital
murder and sentenced him to death. 120 N.J. at 598, 577 A.2d at
457. On different occasions, in the neighborhoods of Newark
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and Harlem, the defendant was seen carrying a large suitcase
which leaked a brownish, putrid substance. Id. at 599-600, 577
A.2d at 457-58. Subsequently, the suitcase and its contents were
discovered in a Newark housing project. Specifically, the suitcase
contained the dismembered and headless torso of a woman. Id.
at 600, 577 A.2d at 458. A post-arrest investigation revealed that
four days after the victim's disappearance, Savage was hospitalized after allegedly falling from the window of a Harlem apartment. Id. at 618, 577 A.2d at 467. The defendant later fled from
the hospital and ran naked through the streets of Harlem with an
intravenous bottle and tube attached to his arm. Id. at 600-01,
577 A.2d at 458.
At trial, the defendant maintained that a young girl had visited his hospital bed, held a pistol to his head and instructed him
to transport the suitcase containing the torso from Harlem to
Newark. Id. at 602, 577 A.2d at 459. Additionally, the state's key
witness testified that the defendant had abused cocaine the night
before the murder. Id. at 603, 577 A.2d at 460. Nevertheless,
defense counsel pursued neither an insanity nor a diminishedcapacity defense. Id. at 605, 577 A.2d at 461. Instead, the defendant's attorney argued that the state's case could not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 607, 577 A.2d at 461.
The jury rejected the reasonable doubt defense and returned a
verdict against the defendant of purposely causing death. Id.,
577 A.2d at 462. In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury determined that the statutory aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced Savage
to death. Id. at 606, 577 A.2d at 462.
Savage appealed, primarily contending that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court for an expansion of the record regarding the sixth amendment claim. Id. at 609, 577 A.2d at
462. On remand, it was revealed that the defense counsel had
personally met with Savage only once before trial. Id. at 610-11,
577 A.2d at 463. Moreover, the defense counsel did not communicate with any of the state's medical witnesses and he did not
attempt to obtain an expert to contradict the expert's testimony
identifying the victim's torso. Id. at 611, 577 A.2d at 463. While
aware of evidence indicating that Savage was hospitalized for psychiatric observation during his service with the Navy, his attorney
made no attempt to recover any records to substantiate that evi-
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dence and in no way explored the possibility of a credible psychiatric or diminished-capacity defense. Id. Despite this new
information, the trial court ruled that the defense counsel had
given Savage effective assistance at the guilt phase of the trial. Id.
at 612, 577 A.2d at 464.
Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed Savage's assertion that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel in derogation of his rights under the sixth amendment of
the United States Constitution and under article I, paragraph 10
of the state constitution. Id. Writing for the court, Justice Garibaldi set forth the two-prong test previously promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 613, 577 A.2d 464 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984)). In Strickland, the
Court announced that in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance-of-counsel claim, the defendant must establish that: (1) his
counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 613, 577 A.2d at 464-65
(citation omitted). A defense counsel's performance is deficient,
explained Justice Garibaldi, when it falls short of an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 614, 577 A.2d at 465 (citation
omitted). The prejudice component, in turn, is satisfied where
there is a "reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. Justice Garibaldi noted that where the deficiency
in counsel's performance is so grave that it amounts to a complete denial of representation, the defendant need not establish
the second prong of the test. Id. at 614-15, 577 A.2d at 465 (citation omitted). By evaluating Savage's claim under the Strickland
analysis, the court expressly reaffirmed its earlier decision not to
apply a stricter test for ineffectiveness claims arising from capital
cases. Id. at 615, 577 A.2d at 465.
Having set forth the proper framework, the court first considered Savage's claim that defense counsel's failure to personally consult with Savage more than once was per se unreasonable
and that he was thus entitled to the presumption of prejudice
reserved in Strickland. Id. at 616, 577 A.2d at 466. While agreeing that a capital defense attorney who communicated with his
client only once before trial would ordinarily warrant a presumption of prejudice, the court noted that the defense counsel allegedly contacted Savage in at least fifteen to thirty telephone
conversations. Id. at 616-17, 577 A.2d at 466. The majority
therefore found that the Strickland presumption was inappropri-
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ate in this case and instead applied the conventional two-prong
test to determine whether, as a result of the limited pretrial consultation, the defense "counsel was able to properly investigate
the case and develop a reasonable defense." Id. at 616, 577 A.2d
at 466.
Under the first prong of the test, Justice Garibaldi queried
whether the defense counsel's performance at the guilt phase of
the trial was deficient. Id. The court's immediate concern was
over defense counsel's decision not to pursue an insanity or diminished capacity defense without first making fundamental and
obvious inquiries into Savage's bizarre conduct and possible
drug addiction. Id. at 618-19, 577 A.2d at 467. Stressing the
paramount importance of adequate pretrial consultation in capital cases, "where strategy is crucial to the life or death determination," the court admonished the attorney for not effectively
evaluating the defendant's mental state during the one personal
meeting before the trial. Id. at 620, 577 A.2d at 468. At a minimum, asserted the court, counsel should have retained an expert
to appraise Savage's psychiatric condition and the effect of narcotics thereon. Id. at 622, 577 A.2d at 469. Justice Garibaldi attributed this oversight to a lack of professionalism commensurate
with the "special considerations in a capital case." Id.
The court was equally dissatisfied with the defense counsel's
failure to explore independent sources of information when developing trial strategy. Id. at 621, 577 A.2d at 468. The majority
observed that, by not interviewing the state's witnesses, defense
counsel failed to assess the strength of the prosecutor's case. Id.
Moreover, the defense counsel never sought out other witnesses
who may have shed light on the defendant's mental state and alleged drug abuse. Id. For these reasons, the majority concluded
that the attorney's pretrial investigation was "no investigation at
all." Id. This failure to reasonably investigate the case rendered
the defense counsel's performance at the trial phase deficient. Id.
at 622, 577 A.2d at 469.
The majority next addressed the issue of whether the defense counsel's performance was deficient during the sentencing
phase of the trial. Id. at 623, 577 A.2d at 469. The court began
by acknowledging that counsel raised five mitigating factors, including extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and diminished capacity by reason of mental disease or defect or
intoxication. See id. at 623, 577 A.2d at 469. citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:l1-3c(5)(a)(d) (West 1982)). Nevertheless, the court
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disapproved of counsel's failure to explore obvious and critical
sources of information that could have substantiated those mitigating factors. Id. at 623, 577 A.2d at 470. Due to this shortcoming, the court deemed the defense counsel's performance in the
sentencing phase similarly deficient. Id. at 625, 577 A.2d at 470.
The court then applied the second prong of the Strickland
test, to determine whether counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant. Id. Justice Garibaldi was convinced
that, had defense counsel made a reasonable attempt to evaluate
his client's apparent mental illness, and had he presented a psychiatric defense, there would be "a reasonable probability" that
the outcome of the guilt phase of the trial would have been different. Id. at 625, 577 A.2d at 470-71. Similarly, the court found
that it was reasonably probable that the jury would not have returned a death sentence had it heard additional evidence of the
defendant's mental illness. Id. at 626, 577 A.2d at 471. Having
determined that counsel's performance was both deficient and
prejudicial at the guilt and penalty stages of the trial, the majority
held that Savage had been deprived of effective assistance of
counsel. Id. On these grounds, the court reversed Savage's conviction and remanded the case to the law division for a new trial.
Id. at 598, 577 A.2d at 457.
The court further extended its review to the defendant's second ground of appeal, namely that the trial court erred by failing
to inform him of his constitutional right to testify. Id. at 626, 577
A.2d at 471. The preliminary question presented to the court
was whether the New Jersey Constitution guarantees a defendant
of the right to testify. Id. The court initially observed that in
New Jersey, the, right to testify is provided for by statute. Id. at
627, 577 A.2d at 471 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-8 (West
1976)). While citing cases in which the right was implicitly assumed, the majority conceded that the right had not been given
definite state constitutional grounding in any New Jersey decision to date. Id. at 628, 577 A.2d at 472.
Justice Garibaldi, therefore, relied on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas for guidance. Id. at
626-27, 577 A.2d at 471 (citing 483 U.S. 44 (1897)). In Rock, the
Court explicitly held that a defendant's right to testify is derived
from several sources in the United States Constitution. Id. at
626, 577 A.2d at 471. The Rock Court explained that the right to
testify is essential to a fair adversarial process, and that it therefore emanates from the due process component of the fourteenth
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amendment. Id. (citation omitted). The Court also stressed that
the right to testify is encompassed by the sixth amendment's
guarantee that a defendant may call witnesses on his own behalf.
Id. at 626-27, 577 A.2d at 471 (citation omitted). Finally, the
Rock Court ascertained that the right to testify is a corollary to
the right not to testify granted by the fifth amendment. Id. at 627,
577 A.2d at 471 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Justice Garibaldi applied the logic of Rock to the analogous
provisions of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. The justice first
posited that the right to testify is essential to the "fair and impartial trial" inherent in the state concept of due process. Id. at 628,
577 A.2d at 472. Moreover, the justice considered this right to
be implicit in the state constitution's guarantee that a defendant
have compulsory process for calling witnesses in his own favor.
Id. The court thus held that the right of a criminal defendant to
testify is protected by article I, paragraphs 1 and 10 of the state
constitution. Id.
Nevertheless, the court rejected Savage's claim that the trial
court was obligated to inform him of that right as well as to obtain a waiver of the right. Id. The court reasoned that the right to
testify, like the corollary right not to testify, is a strategical matter
best left to the client and his counsel. See id. at 629-30, 577 A.2d
at 472-73 (citation omitted). Aside from the impropriety of mandating that a trial court interfere with the attorney-client relationship, the majority was concerned that requiring a trial court to
advise a defendant of his right to testify and to secure a waiver of
that right might "influence the defendant to waive his constitutional right not to testify, thus threatening the exercise of this
other, converse, constitutionally explicit, and more fragile right."
Id. at 629-30, 577 A.2d at 473 (quoting Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d
29, 30 (1st Cir. 1987)).
In relieving trial courts of the duty to advise defendants who
are represented by counsel of their right to testify, the majority
declared that it is the defense counsel's responsibility to advise
the client whether or not to take the stand. Id. at 630-31, 577
A.2d at 473. Moreover, the court warned that a defense attorney's failure to do so would support a claim of ineffective counsel. Id. at 631, 577 A.2d at 473. The court also indicated that it
would be sound practice for a trial court to ask the defense counsel, particularly in a capital case, whether or not he had informed
the defendant of this constitutionally-protected privilege. Id.
Having already resolved to remand the case for a new trial be-
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cause of the other deficiencies in the counsel's performance, the
court did not consider whether the attorney had advised Savage
of his right to testify. Id.
Justice Handler, in a separate opinion, concurred with the
majority's judgment but disagreed with the method used by the
court to evaluate the defense counsel's performance. Id. at 638,
577 A.2d at 477 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In Justice Handler's opinion, defense counsel's failure to
make fundamental inquiries relative to Savage's mental illness
and drug abuse was so incorrigible that the defendant should
have had the benefit of the Strickland presumption of prejudice.
Id. at 640, 577 A.2d at 478 (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Reiterating his conviction that capital defendants are constitutionally entitled to the "highest caliber" of
counsel, the justice also advocated a more stringent standard for
measuring the competence of defense attorneys in death penalty
cases. Id. at 645, 577 A.2d at 480 (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Handler observed that because
the defense counsel's assistance "fell far below the rudimentary
sixth-amendment guarantees afforded any criminal defendant,"
this enhanced standard would have rendered his representation
ineffective irrespective of prejudice. Id. at 646, 577 A.2d at 481
(Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
Aside from cementing decisional law which previously only
alluded to a criminal defendant's state constitutional right to testify, the Savage decision represents the New Jersey Supreme
Court's dedication to a close and critical appellate review of capital records. Indeed, its review is more searching than it cares to
admit; while declining to adopt a stricter test than the Strickland
analysis for capital defendants, the court quietly modifies the deficiency prong by judging a capital defense attorney's performance in light of the "special considerations present in capital
cases." Therefore, the Savage majority and Justice Handler essentially agree on what the latter perceives to be a difference of
opinion. Namely, capital counsel will be held to a level of professionalism reasonably expected from fiduciaries whose clients'
lives are at stake.
Jonathan M. Preziosi
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LESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF CURBSIDE GARBAGE ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL-State

v. Hempele, 120 NJ. 182, 576 A.2d

793 (1990).
In State v. Hempele, an informant disclosed to the state police
that the defendants Sharon Hempele and Conrad Hempele were
distributing controlled substances from their home in Belvidere,
NewJersey. 120 N.J. at 188, 576 A.2d at 796. In support of his
accusation, the informant stated that he had seen approximately
fifty pounds of marijuana in Conrad Hempele's bedroom. Six
months later on two separate occasions, a state trooper seized
white plastic garbage bags from the defendants' garbage can. Id.
at 188-89, 576 A.2d at 796. The trash can was located next to the
front stairway which is separated from the street by an eight foot
wide sidewalk. Id. at 188, 576 A.2d at 796. After both incidents,
the trooper performed a warrantless search of the trash bags. Id.
at 189, 576 A.2d at 796. The fruits of his search included traces
of cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine.
Subsequently, a search warrant for the defendants' home
was issued. The warrant was based upon the evidence discovered
in the trash and the informant's tip. During the search, the police
discovered drug paraphernalia and illicit drugs. Consequently,
the Hempeles were indicted for drug offenses.
On appeal with Hempele was State v. Pasanen, a factually similar case. Id., 576 A.2d at 797. In Pasanen, the Boonton police, on
the basis of an informant's tip, began a surveillance of James
Pasanen's home for evidence of drug activity. The police began
to monitor the trash after they observed convicted drug felons
visiting the defendant's home. Seven times during the course of
their surveillance, the police performed a warrantless search and
seizure of the defendant's gray plastic garbage bags which were
located near the street. The contents of the bags included traces
of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, the police
obtained a search warrant for Pasanen's home. The search
yielded heroin, cocaine and marijuana. As a result, James
Pasanen was indicted for drug offenses.
In Hempele, the trial court determined that the evidence of
the warrantless search should be suppressed because the seizure
occurred on private property and the state failed to prove that
the garbage had been placed outside for collection by sanitation
workers. Id., 576 A.2d at 796-97. Further, the court explained
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that the informant's tip was stale because the police had not acted on it for six months. Id., 576 A.2d at 797. Therefore, the
court posited that the search warrant for the defendant's home
was not valid because there was no basis for it. Id.
The Pasanen Court, however, denied the defendant's suppression motion because the defendant only had a "qualified"
rather than an "absolute" expectation of privacy in the garbage.
Id. at 189-90, 576 A.2d at 797. The court asserted that when the
defendant has a qualified expectation of privacy, a warrant need
only be based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause. Id. at 190, 576 A.2d at 797. The court acknowledged that
both the search of the garbage and the search warrant for the
home were valid. Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division consolidated the two cases and affirmed both trial court rulings. Id. The appellate court recognized that the Pasanen
reasonable-suspicion standard should be employed. Id. In
Pasanen, the court determined that the reasonable-suspicion test
was met because reliable informants had tipped the police; therefore, the court concluded that the evidence should not be suppressed. Id. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's
analysis in Hempele and articulated that neither the fact that the
garbage was left on private property nor the fact that the garbage
was placed on the curb for collection was controlling. Id. at 19091, 576 A.2d at 797. Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed
the suppression order due to the staleness of the information
which prompted the warrantless search and seizure. Id. at 191,
576 A.2d at 797. Moreover, the court maintained that because
there was a lack of reasonable suspicion for the warrantless
search of the trash, the search warrant for the house was also
invalid because it was based on the fruits of an illegal search. Id.
The state's motion for leave to appeal in both cases was granted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. (citation omitted).
Affirming the judgment of the appellate division in Hempele
and reversing the judgment of the appellate division in Pasanen,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that both garbage searches
were valid under the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution but were invalid under article I, paragraph 7 of the
New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 195, 225, 576 A.2d at 799, 81415. Justice Clifford, writing for the court, first examined the warrantless searches in light of the federal Constitution. Id. at 191,
576 A.2d at 798.
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The majority analogized the case at bar to a recent United
States Supreme Court decision in which it held that warrantless
searches of garbage "would violate the [flourth [a]mendment
only if respondents [had] manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable." Id. at 192, 576 A.2d at 798 (citing California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988)). The Greenwood Court posited that it is
unreasonable to have a privacy expectation in curbside trash that
is located in an area accessible to the public. Id.
Justice Clifford articulated that the case at bar was almost
identical to the Greenwood case. Id. at 193, 576 A.2d at 798. The
justice quickly disposed of any distinguishing factors which the
defendants relied upon in their arguments. Id. at 193-94, 576
A.2d at 798-99. For example, Justice Clifford found it insignificant that the trash in Greenwood was seized by a garbage collector
and then turned over to the police while the trash in Hempele and
Pasanen was seized directly by the police. Id. at 193, 576 A.2d at
798. Additionally, the Hempeles argued that Greenwood did not
apply because the trash in Greenwood was on public property while
the Hempeles' trash was within their curtilage. Id., 576 A.2d at
799. In response, the majority noted that the privacy expectation
is the same whether the trash is located on either side of the
property line. Id. at 194, 576 A.2d at 799. Regarding the fourth
amendment issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that because the trash in both cases was accessible to the public, the evidence should not be suppressed. Id. at 194-95, 576 A.2d at 799.
The court next addressed the issue of whether article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protects garbage from
warrantless searches and seizures. Id. at 195, 576 A.2d at 799.
The court stressed that when the United States Constitution does
not adequately protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the liberal text of the New Jersey Constitution may
grant its citizens such expanded rights. Id. (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the majority promulgated that the United States
Constitution establishes the minimal level of constitutional protection, and individual states are permitted to grant their citizens
greater protection. Id. at 196, 576 A.2d at 800.
After discussing the relationship between the New Jersey
and the federal Constitutions, Justice Clifford articulated that
New Jersey would not rely on the two-prong test utilized in
fourth amendment cases. Id. at 198, 576 A.2d at 801. The fourth
amendment test, the majority emphasized, "rests on 'a twofold
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requirement, first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society- is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' " Id.
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967.) (Harlan,
J., concurring)). The majority posited that the "subjective"
prong was not relevant to the state's analysis. Id.The court determined that the two-prong analysis arbitrarily distinguishes between facts that lead to subjective expectations of privacy and
those facts that determine the reasonableness of the expectation.
Id. at 199, 576 A.2d at 801. Justice Clifford stipulated that both
prongs depend on objective criteria. Id., 576 A.2d at 801-02.
Pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution, the justice continued,
the only requirement is that the expectation of privacy be reasonable. Id. at 200, 576 A.2d at 802.
With the standard set in place, the court observed that given
the secrets that one's trash may disclose, it is reasonable for a
person to possess a privacy expectation in garbage. Id. at 201,
576 A.2d at 802. The court continued that as long as the containers conceal items from plain view, the expectation of privacy
in the containers' contents is reasonable. Id. at 203, 576 A.2d at
804.
The state advanced five arguments in support of its position.
Id. at 203-04, 576 A.2d at 804. First, the state argued that garbage left outside on a curb is not immune from inspection by the
uninvited meddler; therefore, an expectation of privacy is not
reasonable. Id. at 204, 576 A.2d at 804. Justice Clifford rejected
this argument by emphasizing that accessibility of the garbage to
others is not dispositive of the issue because a person can have a
privacy expectation in something that is vulnerable to the public.
Id. If that were the case, the court continued, the New Jersey
Constitution would only protect items that were locked up. Id.
Moreover, Justice Clifford emphasized that even those items may
be subjected to intrusion by burglars. Id. Along that analysis,
the court distinguished between scavengers rummaging through
garbage looking for food and police officers rummaging through
garbage looking for incriminating evidence or illegal substances.
Id. at 205-06, 576 A.2d at 804-05. Therefore, the court stressed
that an expectation of privacy can differ regarding different
classes of people. Id. at 205, 576 A.2d at 804.
The majority next rejected the state's argument that there is
no expectation of privacy in garbage that is subsequently removed by a third party. Id. at 206, 576 A.2d at 805. Justice Clif-
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ford observed that the possibility that the trash collector may
consent to a police search does not negate the protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures which the Constitution affords. Id. at 207, 576 A.2d at 806. Therefore, Justice Clifford clarified that even if the garbage collector consents to the
search, the individual's expectation of privacy is not lost when a
container is turned over to a third party. Id. Moreover, the court
stipulated that even though people place their garbage in a location that is accessible to the public, this does not result in a lessened privacy expectation because the contents are not exposed
to the public. Id. at 210, 576 A.2d at 807.
Furthermore, the majority criticized the state's argument
that it is unreasonable for the defendants to have an expectation
of privacy in garbage because it is highly regulated. Id. Justice
Clifford conceded that generally a lessened expectation of privacy may surface when an industry is highly regulated, but it cannot completely strip all state constitutional protections. Id. at
211, 576 A.2d at 807 (citation omitted). Garbage regulation, the
majority emphasized, may actually enhance the expectation of
privacy because many local ordinances actually prohibit garbage
picking. Id., 576 A.2d at 808.
Finally, the majority dismissed the state's argument that
there cannot be any expectation of privacy in garbage because it
is abandoned. Id. at 212, 576 A.2d at 808. The court continued
that the mere fact that an item has been abandoned does not necessarily indicate that the owner has surrendered all privacy interests in the property. Id. at 213, 576 A.2d at 809.
The court concluded that because both the Hempele and
Pasanen trash bags were opaque and concealed the contents from
plain view, the defendants were entitled to an expectation of privacy in the contents of the container. Id. at 215, 576 A.2d at 810.
The majority asserted that the defendants can claim protection
pursuant to article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.
Id.
After determining that curbside garbage is afforded constitutional protection, the court next addressed the requirements for
valid searches and seizures. Id. First, examining the constitutional requirements for seizures of garbage, the majority expressed the view that garbage can be seized without a warrant
based on probable cause because people have an expectation of
privacy in the contents of the trash, not the location of it. Id. at
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217, 576 A.2d at 811. Justice Clifford declared that the police do
not need any cause to seize garbage. Id.
Justice Clifford next examined the requirements for a valid
search in New Jersey. Id. at 217-22, 576 A.2d at 811-13. The
New Jersey Constitution provides in relevant part that a warrant
must be given by "the approval of an impartial judicial officer
based on probable cause before most searches may be undertaken." Id. at 217, 576 A.2d at 811 (quoting State v. Patino, 83
N.J. 1, 7, 414 A.2d 1327, 1330 (1980)). The court stipulated that
only in certain exceptional circumstances when a special need exists can the warrant requirement based on probable cause be
waived. Id. at 218, 576 A.2d at 811 (citation omitted). The majority added that even if a special need does not exist, an exception can be made only after the court "balance[s] the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's interest against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion." Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702
(1983)). Based on the standard set forth in Place, Justice Clifford
determined that no governmental interest existed that would dispense with the probable cause requirement. Id. at 219, 576 A.2d
at 811.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that their opinion was directly contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in
Greenwood and virtually every other jurisdiction that had examined the issue. Id. at 223-24, 576 A.2d at 814. The majority
succinctly stated that the primary basis for their difference was in
the court's belief that garbage discloses a plethora of personal
and intimate details about the individual; therefore, the court
stressed that garbage should be protected. Id. at 225, 576 A.2d
at 814-15. For these reasons, the court affirmed the judgment of
the appellate division in Hempele and reversed and remanded the
appellate division's decision in Pasanen. Id., 576 A.2d at 815. Because the Pasanenopinion determined that the state had a reasonable suspicion for the search, the state supreme court remanded
the case to determine whether there was also probable cause for
the search. Id. at 223, 576 A.2d at 814.
Justice O'Hern concurred with the majority reasoning that
the Greenwood Court may have gone too far in restricting an individual's right to privacy in garbage. Id. at 225-26, 576 A.2d at
815 (O'Hern,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, Justice O'Hern added that the case at bar was not about the
right to search garbage, but rather about federalism and the ex-
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tent to which the state court departs from constitutional precedent. Id. at 225, 576 A.2d at 815 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In that regard, Justice O'Hern dissented
but advocated that the United States Supreme Court should use
discretion in drawing lines regarding the Bill of Rights. Id. at
228, 576 A.2d at 816 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Hern continued that where the Court has
drawn the line for fourth amendment protections that does not
endanger the right to privacy, that line should be respected. Id.
Finally, Justice O'Hern articulated that the state's needs would be
best served if the court "recognized a limited privacy interest in
discarded materials and balanced that with a requirement for reasonably based police action." Id.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Garibaldi recognized that the
New Jersey Constitution may extend the protections afforded
under the United States Constitution. Id. at 229, 576 A.2d at 817
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi, however, warned
that additional protections should be granted only when there is
a good policy reason for doing so. Id. (citation omitted). Justice
Garibaldi attested that article I, paragraph 7 and the fourth
amendment contain almost identical language. Id. at 230, 576
A.2d at 817 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Garibaldi stressed that there is no state statute that addresses the issue, therefore, there is no basis for interpreting the state
constitution in contravention to the federal Constitution. Id.
Moreover, Justice Garibaldi emphasized that garbage is not
unique to any state, therefore, the requirements for a search of
discarded trash should not be decided on independent state
grounds. Id. at 231, 576 A.2d at 817-18 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, Justice Garibaldi rejected the majority's contention
that there is an expectation of privacy in garbage. Id., 576 A.2d
at 818 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi articulated
that a privacy interest is determined not by the nature of the item
but in the method used to preserve it. Id. at 233, 576 A.2d at 819
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Garibaldi continued that there cannot be any privacy expectation in trash that is
placed on a curbside for public inspection that will subsequently
be removed by strangers. Id. at 232, 576 A.2d at 818 (Garibaldi,
J., dissenting). When a person puts trash out, Justice Garibaldi
maintained, that person expects that it will be examined and may
be removed by third parties. Id. at 233, 576 A.2d at 819 (Gari-
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baldi, J., dissenting). In conclusion, Justice Garibaldi determined
that the garbage searches in Hempele and Pasanenwere valid under
both the New Jersey and the federal Constitutions. Id. at 234,
576 A.2d at 819 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
During this era of the "War on Drugs", the New Jersey
Supreme Court's bold decision serves to expand the protections
of the state constitution. The court wisely recognized that an expectation of privacy can differ regarding different classes of people. By espousing this admirable statement, the court was
attempting to distinguish between scavengers rummaging
through garbage and law enforcement officials searching for evidence of a crime. Unfortunately, this new standard leaves citizens of NewJersey in a state of confusion. For these citizens, this
new standard forces them to modify their privacy expectations
depending on whether state or federal officials are searching
their garbage. Pursuant to the fourth amendment, federal law
enforcement officials are permitted to perform a warrantless
search of the trash. On the contrary, pursuant to article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, a state law enforcement
official must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to perform the same search.
Of additional concern is the Hempele Court's proposition that
all opaque containers should be afforded the same level of protection. In essence, the court is protecting a letter discarded in
the trash as vehemently as it is protecting a letter locked in a safe.
This parallel is illogical and inconsistent. It is difficult to conceive that society's expectation of privacy in both situations is
analogous. Moreover, the opaque container rule leaves open the
question of whether clear plastic garbage bags would be protected under the New Jersey Constitution or whether they would
be subject to the plain view exception. Nonetheless, despite the
unanswered questions and undetermined impact, the Hempele decision acts as a reminder to the citizens of New Jersey that the
United States Constitution sets forth the minimal threshold for
constitutional protections. Thus, when the state determines that
its citizens' liberties are being compromised, it has the authority
and duty to expand the constitutional doctrine.
Colleen D. Brennan
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-TRIAL COURT
MAY LIMIT MEDIA ACCESS TO TRANSCRIPTS OF TRIALS CONCERNING SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN-In Re VV Publishing

Corporation, 120 N.J. 508, 577 A.2d 412 (1990).
For a ten-month period in 1987 and 1988, the widely publicized criminal trial, State v. Margaret Kelly Michaels, was tried in
Essex County. 120 N.J. at 512, 577 A.2d at 413. That case involved a 115-count indictment charging that Margaret Kelly
Michaels, while teaching at a day-care center in Maplewood, had
sexually assaulted several three- to five-year-old children.
The testimony of the alleged child-victims was a key component of the state's case. Many parents, however, expressed reluctance in allowing their children to testify due to the possible
future stigma and embarrassment of being identified as a sexualabuse victim. Id., 577 A.2d at 414. The trial court attempted to

serve the competing interests of protecting the privacy rights of
the children and their families on the one hand, and the first
amendment rights of the media on the other. The court also
placed significant weight on the state's testimony requirements.
In evaluating such concerns, the court determined that the publication of the names and addresses of the children and their families as well as any other identifying characteristics should be
forbidden, and placed the transcripts under seal.
After the trial had ended, the Village Voice, a New York City
newspaper which had no representative attending the trial,
sought to have the transcripts unsealed and to be permitted access to the unredacted transcripts containing the names and addresses of the children and their families. Although the Village
Voice consented not to publish anything that could lead to the
identification of the children involved, the newspaper argued that
without the unredacted transcripts it could not accurately report
on the trial. The Village Voice's request was denied. Similarly, the
newspaper's alternate proposal, which would have provided the
newspaper with redacted transcripts omitting all identification of
the children and their families, was also rejected.
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division affirmed
the trial court's restrictions upon media attending the trial, acknowledging that the court had a compelling interest in protecting the children's identities. Id. at 512-13, 577 A.2d at 414. The
appellate division, however, also found that the sealing of the
transcripts violated the trial court's duty to weigh "the least in-
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trusive alternative" in its imposition of restrictions on media access to criminal trials. Id. at 513, 577 A.2d at 414.
Thus, the appellate division ordered the trial court to provide two alternatives for providing trial transcripts. Id. Under
the first alternative, a court representative would redact the transcripts to remove the names, addresses, and identifying characteristics of the children and their families and would provide such
redacted transcripts at the expense of the Village Voice. Id. Under
the second alternative, the Village Voice would receive unredacted
transcripts subject to the execution of a guarantee of non-disclosure identical to the restrictions placed on the media attending
the trial. Id.
On remand, the trial judge expressed preference for the first
alternative enunciated by the appellate division, but felt constrained to interpret the appellate court's decision as conferring
the choice of "alternatives" upon the Village Voice. Id. at 513-14,
577 A.2d at 414-15. Hence, the trial court unsealed the transcripts and proscribed any publication of the names, addresses,
or identifying characteristics by the Village Voice or other media
gaining access to the unredacted transcripts. Id. at 514, 577 A.2d
at 415. Additionally, the trial court ordered such transcripts to
be kept in a secure place with access restricted to reporters
deemed "journalistically appropriate." Id. Also, the trial court
ordered that a court-appointed attorney would redact the transcripts to exclude all in camera proceedings and side-bar conferences. Id.
The trial court's new order was appealed by the state and the
intervening parents of the complaining minor witnesses. Id. The
appellate division summarily affirmed without explaining
whether its initial opinion left discretion with the trial court or
the media in receiving redacted or unredacted transcripts. Id. at
511, 577 A.2d at 413. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
certification. Id.
Writing for the court, Justice Stein held that due to the competing interests of the victims, their parents, the media, and the
state, and the highly sensitive nature of the subject matter, a
court must be entrusted with broad discretion in crafting guidelines for providing trial transcripts to the media. Id. at 519, 577
A.2d at 417-18. Consequently, the court determined that under
the circumstances presented, the Village Voice was only entitled to
redacted trial transcripts. Id. at 519-20, 577 A.2d at 418.
Justice Stein began the court's analysis by agreeing with the
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appellate division's articulation of the governing principles regarding the placement of limitations on the right of access to
criminal trials. Id. at 514, 577 A.2d at 415. The court recognized
that the right of access to criminal proceedings is inherent in the
first amendment, and that this right can be abridged only by a
compelling state interest. Id. Justice Stein also noted the "institutional value" in opening criminal trials to public scrutiny. Id. at
514-15, 577 A.2d at 415 (citation omitted). Additionally, the
court acknowledged that the implication of a state interest in the
psychological well-being of the victim does not warrant a
mandatory closure rule, and that such a state interest must be
examined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 515, 577 A.2d at 415.
Justice Stein further noted that although a right to transcripts of a criminal trial is not a constitutionally-protected right,
the United States Supreme Court has "treated the right to transcripts as co-extensive with the right of access to the proceedings." Id. at 515-16, 577 A.2d at 415-16 (citation omitted). In
addition, Justice Stein observed that in the context of transcripts
of voir dire proceedings, the trial court could only seal those parts
of the transcripts related to the compelling interest of juror privacy and was required to release the remaining portions of the
transcripts. Id. at 516, 577 A.2d at 416 (citation omitted).
The court next recognized the media's right of access to
criminal pretrial proceedings. 120 NJ. at 516, 577 A.2d at 416
(citation omitted). Despite the first amendment imperatives behind the right of access to criminal proceedings, Justice Stein
pointed out that this right may conflict with other protected
rights. Id. at 517, 577 A.2d at 416. The court also explained that
one basis of its authority to restrict access to criminal proceedings is the judiciary's responsibility to guarantee a fair trial. Id.
(citation omitted). Justice Stein also observed that the New
Jersey Court Rules directly address situations implicating the
right of access to criminal proceedings. 120 N.J. at 517, 577 A.2d
at 416 (citing NJ. CT. R. 1:2-1; 3:6-7; 3:13-3(d)(a)(1990)).
The court continued its analysis by pointing out that shortly
after the Michaels trial had ended, the legislature enacted NJ.
STAT. ANN. 2A:82-46 (West 1990), which prohibits the publication of the names, addresses, and identities of minor-victims of
sexual offenses. 120 N.J. at 518, 577 A.2d at 417. The legislature also empowered the courts "to impose further restrictions
on disclosure to prevent trauma or stigma to such minor victims." Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-46d (West 1990)).

218

SE TON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:192

Justice Stein found that the trial court's original pretrial order was in accord with the legislature's desire to protect minor
victims of sexual abuse. Id. The court also stressed that the validity of the pretrial order was not challenged by any of the media
who had attended the trial. Id. Justice Stein reiterated that the
order was partially motivated by the prosecution's assertion that
several parents demanded "an assurance of confidentiality"
before allowing their children to testify. Id. Thus, Justice Stein
concluded that the state's duty to protect the child-victims from
"unnecessary publicity and notoriety," coupled with the possible
impairment of the state's case justified the order prohibiting media disclosure of the victims' identities. Id.
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the pretrial order
was not a prior restraint on publication because the media was
allowed to attend and report on the trial, subject to the court's
restrictions. Id. at 518-19, 577 A.2d at 417 (citations omitted).
Thus, Justice Stein "perceive[d] no conflict between the procedure invoked to protect the children's identities and the rights of
access to court proceedings protected by the first amendment."
Id. at 519, 577 A.2d at 417.
The court also recognized the basis for the trial judge's preference for providing only redacted transcripts to the Village Voice.
Id. Justice Stein opined that the trial court was justifiably concerned that members of the media not subject to the pretrial order might acquire the unredacted transcripts. Id. Therefore, the
court concluded that the provision of a redacted transcript
"posed a measurably less-substantial risk of disclosure of the
children's identities than the alternative authorizing unredacted
transcripts." Id. The court held that the trial court should have
been given the authority to set forth procedures by which the
Village Voice, and other media, could acquire trial transcripts, and
that the trial court had properly weighed all the competing interests in issuing the pretrial order. Id. at 519-20, 577 A.2d at 41718.
In dissent,Justice Clifford, joined by Justice Pollock, argued
that the majority had decided the wrong question in the wrong
way and had swept aside basic precepts of appellate practice in
the process. Id. at 520, 577 A.2d at 418 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
First, Justice Clifford opined that the court had created an ambiguity in the appellate division's initial decision where none previously existed. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting). In Justice Clifford's
view, by providing alternative procedures for the acquisition of
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the transcripts, the appellate division intended to confer the
choice of alternatives on the Village Voice, while charging the trial
court with supervision of the "mechanics" of providing the transcripts. Id. at 521, 577 A.2d at 418 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford stressed that any ambiguity perceived in the
appellate division's opinion was "sheer invention." Id.
Moreover, Justice Clifford emphasized that the emergent appeal to the appellate division was taken only after the Village Voice
had selected the second alternative set forth in the appellate division's initial judgment. Id. The dissenting justice contended that
the only issue presented on the second appeal was the consistency of the trial court's new order with the earlier opinion of the
appellate division, and that the court should also have summarily
affirmed. Id.
Thus, Justice Clifford criticized the court for resurrecting "a
dead issue." Id. at 522, 577 A.2d at 419 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Justice Clifford opined that the appellate division's initial disposition had properly considered the competing interests involved
and that the court should not have questioned the decision. Id.
Justice Clifford further noted that the trial spectators, idle
neighborhood gossip, or even reporter's private notes pose substantial risks of disclosure of the identities of the child victims
which the court cannot prevent. Id. Such risks, Justice Clifford
concludes, are "the sometimes-painful price of a free and open
society." Id.
The In re VV Publishing Corporation decision represents a realistic balancing of the divergent interests involved when the media
desires access to transcripts of criminal proceedings concerning
the sensitive issue of sexual abuse of young children. The New
Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the media's first amendment rights cannot be considered in a vacuum, but must be analyzed in the context of the privacy rights of the victims and their
families, and the state's need to assure confidentiality to secure
the testimony of the abused children. In striking a balance between those competing interests, the court properly found that
the trial court was in the best position to determine what procedure should be employed to provide trial transcripts to the
media.
While criticism may be levelled at the court for brushing
aside the technical niceties of appellate practice to reach the issue
decided, such a position ignores the special supervisory function
of the court in overseeing the administration of justice in the
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New Jersey court system. The court cannot simply forego its
duty to speak definitively upon such a sensitive substantive issue.
In In re VV Publishing Corporation the court exercised this supervisory authority to place the determination of proper procedures
for providing the media with trial transcripts in the hands of the
trial court.
Kevin J. O'Connor

